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THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNIVERSAL BANKING: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL REGIMES
IN USA AND INDIA
Amrut S. Joshi &M.P. Kartik*
Introduction
Global financial markets today are in the midst of an extraordinary revolution. New products, new
technology, and an explosion in cross-border financial activity have combined to transform traditional
patterns of finance. The past two decades have witnessed the transformation of international financial
markets by three key developments: globalization of the financial services industry; functional
integration of the banking and securities industries; and financial innovation, particularly in the
derivative products area.
Banks are the principal players in the international financial markets. Since the 1960s,' international banking
has grown rapidly in scale and scope, developing a diverse range of services and activities. Recent years have
seen a wave of mergers amongst international banks, driven by competition, globalization, technology and
deregulation, producing more powerful players. Nevertheless, such financial developments can be of any
value only when they contribute significantly to growth and poverty reduction. Therefore, it is necessary to
examine developments in the financial sector, and analyze their impact on larger developmental processes.
Traditionally, financial services companies have rarely been clubbed under one moniker. There are
commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, brokerages, mutual funds, etc., but very rarely
have they been seen as operating in one sector or satisfying one need, although all of them aim to satisfy the
same underlying consumer needs, which are the temporal transfer of money, safety, security, and liquidity
of investments. This paper is an attempt at tracing the evolution of the concept of "universal banking"3 , a
development through which banks conduct deposit taking and lending, securities underwriting, as well as a
range of other undertakings such as insurance, investment management, and corporate and advisory
services. This concept of universal banking has blurred the traditional distinction between commercial
banks and investment banks. Thus, before we undertake a study of the legal implications of universal
IV Year RA., LLB(Hons.) Students, National Law School of India University. We thank Anil Kumar Rai, Associate
Professor, National Law School of India University, for the valuable advice provided by him in the writing of this
paper.
The economic interdependence of Western nations was critically boosted by the general return to convertibility
at the end of the 1950s. The 1960s, therefore, recorded innovative trends in international banking and finance,
leading to a wave of financial globalization, See Central Banking, Crwncy Cnswbi6ty and Eonamec Interdependenc* Case
Shnes from Western Eumpe in the 1960s, at http://www.bankinghistory.de/Bulletin/EABH-web/web20l-/

EABHnoticeboard.htm (last visited September 25, 2002).
The most striking example of a banking mega merger occurred in April 1998 when Citicorp and Travelers Group
merged to form the largest financial senvices firm in the world. The merger amounted to a $70 billion deal with a
total of 100 million customers in over 100 countries and a net capital of SSO billion, and operating capital of over
570 billion. See Traevkrs Group - Citicorp annonae merger - largest eer, at http://www.bib.net/6L1498cghtn (last visited
January 3, 2002).
Professor Charles W Calomiris has defined universal banking as a banking system made up of large scale banks
that operate extensive networks of branches, provide many different services, hold several claims on firms
(including equity and debt), and participate directly in the corporate governance of firms that rely on the banks as
sources of funding or as securities underwriters. See Charles W Calonins. Uniersal Ranking and the finandg of
indwaial dewispen
at http://wwwworldbank.org/htrnl/dec/Publicaions/Workpapers/wpsl533html
(last visited
January 3, 2002),
I
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banking and the regulatory challenges posed by it, it would be useful-to describe the traditionally defined
activities of commercial banks and investment banks.
Commercial Banking: The essence of commercial banking is the acceptance of deposits and the
disbursement of loans. However, commercial banks also offer a variety of other financial services, such as
foreign exchange, insurance, and credit cards. They operate at both retail and wholesale levels. Retail banking
is servicing the general public and small businesses, traditionally through a bank branch network; it
involves a large volume of low value transactions. Wholesale banking comprises dealings with fellow
banks (both commercial banks and investment banks), central banks, and other financial institutions
("Fl"), especially in the inter-bank market- the money market in which banks lend and borrow amongst
themselves; wholesale banking involves a relatively small number of high value transactions. The range of
activities conducted by commercial banks varies from country to country. In the United States of America
and the United Kingdom, commercial banks that take deposits and make loans have traditionally been
separate entities from investment banks and merchant banks, whose business is securities underwriting
and related activities?
Investment Banking: Investment banking comprises four core functions: firstly, the raising of capital,
where the bank underwrites, structures and sells equities and debt for corporations, governments and
institutions; secondly, the bank performs the trading function where it makes markets in securities for
investors who want to buy and sell, and trading on a bank's own account; thirdly, an investment bank also
advises companies and governments on a wide variety of financial matters; fourthly, an investment bank
also performs the function of asset management where it manages funds for institutional investors, inhouse mutual funds, and unit trusts.' There is a growing overlap between investment and commercial
banks, and the traditional distinctions between them are becoming more and more blurred. Reflecting this
trend of overlap is a move towards universal banking.
Universal Banking: In their historical development, organizational structure, and strategic direction,
universal banks, in essence, constitute multi-product firms that are active in the financial services sector.' A
universal bank effectively targets most or all client segments, and makes an effort to provide each with a full
range of appropriate financial services. The amalgamation of more or less distinct businesses that are
linked together in an unusually complex network, which draws on a set of centralized financial, human, and
organizational resources, makes universal banking controversial in nature. This is so because it raises the
issue of whether a depositor or a shareholder's investment in a universal bank is an attractive investment
from the perspective of risk-adjusted total return and portfolio efficiency. This issue is dealt with in greater
detail in subsequent chapters of this paperY
Professor Ingo Walter, Professor of Applied Financial Economics at the Leonard N. Stern School of
Business, New York University, has categorized universal banks further.9 According to him, the specific
structures that universal banks adopt are dependent upon the regulatory regimes under which they
function, as well as the demand-side issues relating to market structure and client preferences. He describes

ONAL FiNANC 54 (1999).
Ross CRANSrMN, PRiNciPUs Or BANKiNGiLa 21 (1997).
Calomiris, spm note 3, at 66.
Ingo Walter, Universal Banking: A Shareholder Value Perspective, Paper presented at a conference on shareholder
value concepts in Banking (November 27, 1996)
fInf note 22.
Waiter, sepw note 7.
RICHARD ROBRS IN51DF
k
INSITI
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four distinct forms of universal banking structures of which, the Type-A bank structure represents the
most liberalized form of universal banking, whereas the Type-D bank structure represents the most
restricted form of universal banking Till recently, the American legal regime was supposed to be permissive
of only the Type-D structure of universal banking. This was because of the strict separation of commercial
banking and investment banking by the Banking Act, 1933, better known as the Glass-Steagall Act, 1933, in
the United States; but over a period of time, the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act were diluted by
legislative and judicial intervention, till the Act was actually repealed on November 12, 1999.
This paper initially examines the evolution of the regulatory framework that has gradually permitted
universal banking across jurisdictions. In this context, the discussion begins by tracing the historical reasons
for the segregation of commercial and investment banking in the United States. In the first part of the
paper, the historical reasons for the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 in the United States, which
imposed a strict separation between commercial banking and investment banking activities, are examined,
as also the legislative intent behind the Act. The Glass-Steagall Act has been chosen to begin a discussion of
universal banking because the contemporary understanding of universal banking is drawn on the basis of
its historical regulation." Thereafter, the paper discusses the consequences of the segregation of
commercial and investment banking activities, and the manner in which banks tried to work around the

A fully integrated universal bank (Type-A) provides a broad range of financial services (banking, securities and
insurance) under a single corporate structure supported by a single capital base. There are, at present, no good
examples of this particular model.
A partially integrated universal bank (Type-B) conducts both commercial and investment banking within the same
entity, but undertakes insurance underwriting and distribution, as well as mortgage banking, asset management,
lease-financing, factoring, management consulting, and other specialized activities through separately capitalized
subsidiaries, either because such activities are separately regulated, or because they involve significant potential
for exploitation of conflicts of interest, or a combination of such factors. Deutsche Bank AG would be a good
example of this type of universal banking structure. In India, is may be said that the reverse merger between ICICI
and its subsidiary ICICI Bank, if approved, could lead to the development of this form of universal banking.
In a Type-C universal bank, the commercial bank whose core business is taking deposits and making commercial
loans, is the parent of subsidiaries engaged in a variety of other financial services, ranging from investment
banking to insurance. An example would be Barclays Bank Plc.
A final universal banking structure (Type-D) involves creation of a holding company, which controls affiliates
engaged in commercial banking, investment banking, insurance, and possibly other types of financial and nonfinancial businesses. Examples include JE Morgan Chase, Walter, supra note 7.
The historical origins of universal banking arc explained by one author thus:
"By the nineteenth century, there sere two ditsdet mode/i of banking practire: the Enkh 0,stem and the German system. The English
system was characterized ly a sharp deson bheloen cmmreal banking and invetment banking, in contrast to the German financial
sysfem where it was tummon practie for one institutdon to presid both commercial and investment banking senices. Prior to the
enformied to the Englih model Howeer, nith the advent of tie imst
American Ciil War, American finandal pracde general
company in the posibellum era, the American yrstemmon close appmximated the German model This change osared becausetrt!
compames, which had onginaly restricted their senices to the admeinistradon of estates and nik, expanded their senices and began to
solt deposils from the pnblic, the becoming direct covpettrs of the commercial bankr. Commenial bank.r rporded by incmasnng tbeir
presence in sheinvstment-banking field Camemal boaks wre enormour smcrrsjil in their eforts. By 1930, iommnercial banks and
their seuriher afihales wr the "dominant force" in the nisnrent-hanking feld, sponsoring ovr ha#' of all nen'srdy issuer.
Hownew; the economic and poklical clmate that had permited the mering of commerial and investment banking rnderent dramatic
changes with the onset of the Great Depresion. Widespread bank farers sevrn rsded pubhc confidence in the dmestic banking
industry."
SeePerkins, The Ditorce of Commerdal and Initment Banking A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483, 485-87 (1971). Thus, while
universal banking had its origins in the German bankng system, post-Depression, most banking systems across the
world followed the English system, and the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act provided an additional rationale for
banking regulation. Hence, the authors have used the Glass-Steagall Act as the basis for beginning a discussion on
universal banking and its historical regulation.
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restrictions imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act. The judicial interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act has also
been examined, as it was an important source of relaxation of the restrictions imposed by the Act. The
reasons for an increased thrust towards universal banking in the late eighties are also discussed. Having
examined the historical reasons for the separation of commercial and investment banking activities, and the
gradual relaxation of the restrictions on universal banking, the arguments raised in favour of and against
universal banking are examined in the third part of the paper, following which this analysis is applied to the
Indian economy. Finally, the Indian regulatory regime is examined for its relevance and support for the
creation of a universal banking regime in India. While there are no legal or regulatory restrictions on
adoption of universal banking in India, there are, however, prudential requirements as also entry
conditions applicable to all FIs that desire to convert to banks. 2 The debate on universal banking in India
has arisen because FIs have felt the need to convert themselves into universal banks. The regulatory
challenges posed by a universal banking regime are examined, and in this context, the need for increased
coordination between the various regulatory agencies in the financial services sector is suggested. The scope
of this paper is limited to the study of universal banking as a concept, referring merely to the concept of
combination of commercial banking and investment banking. This is a narrow definition of the term
"universal banking"."

"

Prudential requirements are those requirements that are imposed to ensure that Hs are in proper compliance with
capital adequacy requirements as called for in the various sections of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and
properly state: a) valuation of assets, b) depreciation of assets, and c) provision for bad and doubtful debts. These
requirements are also imposed to ensure that Ps are quantitatively identifying their non-performing credit
facilities in order to help ensure that collection efforts are undertaken; amd to ensure that FIs present balance
sheets and income statements that properly reflect the financial impact of non-perforning credit facilities. The
rationale for prudential requirements is that (1) FIs need to, in an accounting sense, recognize problem assets
using a quantitative definition of non-performing and then properly treat assets with regard to accrual of interest,
classification according to ultimate collectibility, and to make adequate provisions based on such lassification; (2)
The recognition of such non-performing assets stimulates collection efforts and thus helpS reduce the possibility
of loss on such assets; (3) Supervisory authorities worldwide have recognized that their effectiveness is
dependent on the integrity of balance sheets and income statements resulting from proper identification and
accounting treatment of non-performing assets. Failure to set such standards can lead to fictitious profits and
misleading balance sheets to the supervisory authority and other interested parties. The above-mentioned rationale
for prudential requirements hss been borrowed from the Statement on Prudential Norms for Financial
Institutions issued by the Bank of Uganda, the Central Bank of Uganda. See Praknial Norms for FinancialInstituions,
ad http://www.bou.orug/PrudentFLPDP (last visited October 20, 2002). This rationale is accepted in most
jurisdictions.

"

Daniel Verdier, The OGins of Unisrsal Banking in 19^ Centray Enpe, North America and Adsrab~ia, at http://
www.ineit/SPS/Stff/Verdi/head7.pdf (last visited January 3, 2002). See also Hanmnising The Ro4k and Operations of
Dewkpr
Finandal Insdiiions and Bookr A Dircusion Paper, at http://www.rbi.org.in (last visited January 3, 2002),

wherein it is stated: "The term "universal banks" in general refers to the combination of commercial banking and
investment banking, i.e., issuing underwriting, investing and trading in securities. In a very broad sense, however,
the term "nsesnal hanke" refers to those banks that offer a wide variety of financial services, especially insurance."
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The History of Banking Regulation in the United States - the Glass-Steagall
Act: Traditional Reasons for its Enactment
The concept of universal banking and its regulation has an interesting history in the United States. Until its
repeal, the Glass-Steagall Act, 1933, provided the regulation that prohibited universal banking in the United
States. The Glass-Steagall Act" comprised four sections of the Banking Act of 1933", which restricted
commercial bank involvement in investment banking The Glass-Steagall Act was enacted during a period
of substantial uncertainty in the financial services industry. The traditional view has been that the Congress
believed that a rigid separation of commercial and investment banking activities could prevent another
stock market crash like the one in 1929." Prior to 1933, commercial banks engaged in a wide array of
securities activities through so-called bank securities affiliates," According to Congress, these affiliates
"made one of the greatest contibutions to the unprecedented disaster which has carned this almost incurable depression."
Congress, when reviewing the economic crisis left by the stock market crash of 1929, did not tarry over the
question of whether or not it should limit the scope of commercial banks' activities. Rather, the debate

"

The Act was named after its congressional sponsors, Senator Carter Glass and Congressman Henry Steagall.

"

Section 16, codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.

5

24 (seventh) (1976 & Supp, 1983), provided that "The business of deaing

in seaidies and -tock by the naional bank shall be EriMied to pinrhanng and seng surb securities and sock wilbout ncourse, so/elr
upon
r ner, andfor the accont of arstoer, and in no casefor iis own waan4, and the mnaesnal bank shall no, uendeanitr any
isue of secitnies or stick. . ."

Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited the affiliation of a Federal Reserve member bank with any
orgsniization "engaged principally" in the underwriting business. 12 US.C. S 377 (1976)
Section 21, codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. S 378(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1983), provides that: "I1 shall be nlanddfor any
person,

.

. or .

. opinilation, engaged in the bsinesr of irsnnzg, unde'writing, sellin,

nodes, or eher scariies,to engageat the some

we . .. in Ibe bssineas of sritrng deposilt-

or dishibating . ..

strks, bonds, debentnres,

2'

Section 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, prohibits, inter a/ia, any partner or employee of any partnership primarily
engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through
syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities from serving at the same time as an officer,
director, or employee of a member bank. 12 U.&C.S. S 78.
" The purpose of this Act was to protect bank depositors against a repeat of the era of widespread bank closings of
the Great Depression. Congress believed that the rash of bank failures was attributable in part to speculative
actviieos by banks made possible by the connections between cormmercial banking and investment banking.
However, there is no evidence that the 1929 stock market crash was caused by the collapse of the banking system,
nor is there any evidence to suggest that commercial bank securities activities caused the failure of a single bank.
It has been shown that the causes of the bank failures during the Great Depression were general economic
conditions, restrictive monetary policy, and protectionist trade measures. Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System stated: "Research over the last 50 years concludes, contrary to
Congress' view at the time, that bank securities activities were not a cause of the Great Depression and that banks
with securities affiliates did not fail in proportionately greater numbers than banks more general%." See Legislative
Proposals to Restructure our Financial System: Hearings on 1886, 1891, and 1905 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1987) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), reprinted in Bill Shaw and John R. Rowlett, Reforming the US.
BanksngSyrien. LsxomrfvmAbrad, 19 Norrn CAROLINA JoURNAL OF IsreNArsIonA. & COMERCiAL RccL:AnoN 91, 98 (1993).
See abto George G. Kaufman & Larry R. Mote, GassSteagll Repeal by regulatry andjudidalreinterpetaion, 107 BAsiKING
L J.388 (1990).

" Securities affiliates were business entities related to banks, which were engaged principally in the issue, flotation,
underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes, or other securities. Section 20 of the Banking Act, 1933 defined "affiliation" as direct or
indirect ownership or control of more than 50 percent of a company's voting stock or a majoritr of common
directors. See Joan K. Willin, Comzmenial Banks and the Glass-Steagall Act: A Sunro of New Producte and Acdiiiies, 104,
BANKiNG LJ. 5,10 (1987).
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centred on whether commercial banks' investment banking should be prohibited absolutely or merely
regulated. Congress chose prohibition, i.e, outright separation of functions, on the stated theory that the
mere existence of commercial banks' securities operations, no matter how carefully and conservatively run,
was inconsistent with the best interest of the bank as a whole." Thus, the traditional understanding has
been that, fuelled by the crash of the market in 1929, the legislative intent'9 behind the Glass-Steagall Act
was to ensure that commercial banks were held to a higher standard of care when making investments than
investment banks (so-called safety concerns), and that banks should be held to a higher standard of care
than other Fis when dealing with customers (so-called conflicts of interest concerns). 20 However, it is
submitted that these two motivations behind the enactment do not appear to be coherent because of the
following reasons.
Safety Concerns
Any notion that the Glass-Steagall Act can be justified on the ground that commercial banks arc somehow
made safer by the Act's prohibitions is clearly misguided, since the law, if anything, accomplishes precisely
the opposite result. This is because, if commercial banks are allowed to buy and sell stocks, they could
diversify their portfolio of assets, thereby reducing risk. 2' As a firm's costs of operation are reduced, the
firm necessarily becomes less risky, since such a firm can earn a concomitantly lower gross return on
22
investment without risking insolvency. To put it in simple language, since a firm has placed its eggs in
several baskets, rather than just one, the chances of its failure is reduced.
Conflicts of Interest Concerns
With regard to the second concern, the legislature was said to have acted under the premise that public
23
confidence and customer goodwill were essential to bank solvency. There was a concern that a customer
might withdraw his money if he lost money on a securities investment bought from the bank, thereby
threatening the bank's stability For example, the customer might withdraw all his money from the bank,
thereby threatening the bank's stability. Similarly, if the bank's securities department proved unprofitable,
public confidence in the bank would erode. None of these public confidence concerns, however, provides a
persuasive justification for the Glass-Steagall Act. There is no reason why public confidence in a bank will be
threatened more if the bank loses money in its securities operations than in its lending operations. The

" 75 CONG REC. 9913 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley), died from Perkins, supm note 11 at 485-87.
" In addition to the obvious hazards the Act was meant to curb, Congress was also concerned about more subtle
dangers that arise when a bank enters the investment banking forum. These concerns include: 1) the bank's
temptation to shore up an investment affiliate through unsound loans or other aid; 2) the possibility that the bank
would make its credit ficilities more freely available to those companies in whose stock or securities the bank or
its affiliate invests; 3) the bank's impairment as an impartial source of credit due to its salesman's interest; 4) the
loss of depositor goodwill resulting from the depositors' losses incurred on investments they purchased in
reliance on the relationship between the bank and its affiliate; 5) the bank lending its reputation for prudence and
restraint to the issuers of the securities, thereby discrediting its conservative reputation upon which public
confidence rests; and 6) the bank's temptation to make loans to customers with the expectation that the loans
would facilitate the purchase of stock or securities. C.f. Curtis J. Polk, Banking and Sernnier lnn" The Gloss-Steagall
Act-- Has It OnfiredliUsepfdnesdl, 55 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 812, 814 (1987).
ia
LJ. 1, 5 (1984).
Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Group Lgiuation and the judil Fundon, 33
If the relevant indicis of safety of investments is the rate of return, by forbidding banks from diversifying their
asset portfolios by holding stock, the Glass-Steagall Act made commercial banking a riskier endeavor, not a safer
one. Id. at 12.
22 Id

6
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failure of Indian banks to recover huge debts from industrial borrowers is a classic example of a banking
24
system threatened equally by its lending operations. Hence, it may be faulty to presume that the general
stability of the banking system generally is threatened by irate deposit customers making withdrawals
merely because of losses suffered in stock purchases. Actually, the effect will be that deposits will simply
flow to those banks that give sound investment advice.

The Counter to the Traditional Reasons: The Interest Group Theory
ProfessorJonathon Macey of the Emory University School of Law offers an alternative to the traditional
understanding of the Glass-Steagall Act. He argues that the Act represents the triumph of one special
interest group, the investment bankers, over another interest group, the commercial bankers. The
hypothesis offered by Macey is that the Act was passed because a special interestgroup, namely investment
bankers, perhaps along with some commercial bankers who wanted to leave the field, was able to persuade
26
Congress to prohibit commercial banks from competing with the group. Macey believes that it is likely
that as Congress had decided to segregate commercial banking and investment banking, some segment of
commercial banks may have wanted to abandon investment banking, but only if their competitors were
barred from taking customers away by offering the service. Hence, this theory propounds the view that
more powerful groups are more likely to see their interests reflected in legislation than weaker groups. Since
Congress, like much of the general public, placed much of the blame for the great Depression squarely on
the shoulders of the nation's commercial banks, they were in no position to adequately defend themselves
during the early 1930s. Hence, the interests of the investment bankers advocating segregation may have
prevailed. While this theory certainly presents an interesting alternative, it also clearly suggests that the
Glass-Steagall Act had no basis or foundation.

The Consequences of the Separation of Investment and Commercial Banking
in the United States
The consequence of the regulation on the activities of commercial banks in the United States was a
situation where banking and commerce were unnaturally separated. This resulted in high information and
monitoring costs for bank lenders and other intermediaries in the capital markets. As these costs rose, the

" The Indian banking sector has been plagued with the problem of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) for a long time.
NPAs reflect the performance of banks. A high level of NPAs suggests a high probability of a large number of
credit defaults that affect the profitability and net worth of banks. In addition to this, NPAR also affect cash flows.
According to the Reserve Bank of India, the gross NPAs of scheduled commercial banks rose from 14.4% in
March, 1998, to 14.60% in March, 1999. Thus, rising NPAs are a matter of concern for banks. In India, the banking
sector is still not strong on the solvency front. Having adhered to stipulated capital adequacy norms does not
suggest that a bank is strong enough. It is important to improve the quality of assets and ensure timely recovery of
defauit swps, at http://wwwthemanagementor.com/k-universe/
n
cre
NPAs ly
Maony
loans. Se
knailers universe/financeknailers/FIFSManage.htrmi (last visied July 20, 2002), Thus, the Indian banking sector
may serve as an example of a banking system threatened more by its lending operations than by any other
acuvitis. Thus public confidence in the banking system would be threatened if more and more banks and Fls are
pushed towards insolvency due to a large number of NPAs. This is because servicing of NPAs and providing for
them on the balance sheet of banks will drain the resources of banks.

" Macey, s"r note 20, at 16.
27
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result was higher interest rates for business. Regulatory intervention and the higher costs associated with
it created an environment where corporations sought less expensive means of raising capital. Thus, at the
same time, relational investment by financial intermediaries other than banks became more viable because
of the lower costs associated with raising capital from sources other than commercial banks. As a result,
commercial banking suffered. In fact, commercial banking's decline is a study in regulatory interference and
disruption of natural market dynamics. The Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act, 1956
(BHCA), acted to prevent banking from following a course driven by the market and thus stifled the
innovative forces of competitiveness. Most banks in the United States were held by a bank holding
company (BHC). A BHC is a corporation that controls one or more banks. These holding companies were
initially created for the purpose of avoiding restrictive state bank branching regulations. One of the benefits
of organization as a holding company was the ability to diversify into other lines of financial business, such
as insurance or securities underwriting, otherwise statutorily prohibited to a depository institution, except
under very limited circumstances. However, smaller state banks began to see such organizations as a
competitive threat, and the BHCA was passed in 1956. The BHCA and its amendments eliminated many
of the regulatory advantages of forming a holding company and formation of BHCs slowed in its wake.
Under the BHCA, holding companies were only permitted to engage directly or through subsidiaries in
activities that were closely related to banking. Thus, any attempt by commercial banks to overcome the strict
29
segregation of commercial banking and investment banking was effectively scuttled by these two laws.
Since the stated original intent of restrictive or firewall legislation such as Glass-Steagall and the BHCA was
to protect the integrity of the United States financial system, it is ironic that these regulations imperiled the
profitability of the institutions that they sought to protect. Thus, the commercial banking industry in the
United States made several attempts to maintain profitability with incursions into territories formerly
reserved to investment banks. In order to maintain profitability, banks in the United States not only had to
compete in the marketplace, but they also had to do so under the constraints of a stringent regulatory
regime. Nevertheless, American commercial banks tried to innovate and grow by introducing innovative
products and services. Under the holding company corporate umbrella, banks expanded the geographical
areas that they served and the array of financial services that they offered to the public. Their innovative
measures were met with a mixed response from the American judiciary. In this context, two important
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have been used to illustrate the manner in which the
rigour of the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act was somewhat diluted by judicial interpretation.

* The modern corporation evolved as a response to the increasing commercial needs of the Industrial Revolution. The
capitalist system created the need for the corporate form as a means for amassing the risk-capital necessary for large
enterprises that could take advantage of economies of scale and scope of production. The classic conception of the
modern corporation is based upon the Berle-Means Model. This study of corporate structures describes how the
need to gather capital from diversified shareholders caused control of the public corporation to shift from the
owners to the managers. Implicit in this model is the notion that market forces are responsible for the current and
continuing state of corporate governance affairs in the United States. The commentators point to the Glass-Steagall
Act and the Bank Holding Company Act as specific examples of how government regulation has shaped the moderm
corporation by placing restrictions on the capital markets and regulating the relationships between creditors and
management. If or when an Fl became a shareholder in a non-financial enterprise, artificial regulatory barriers
imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act prevented the shareholding institution's active participation in corporate affairs,
increased monitoring costs, and decreased efficiency. Accordingly, the bank was prevented from balancing its
interests as a creditor and a shareholder. See Mark t. Nance and Bernd Singhof, Bankisj'r infkene our non-banking
cwmpania afer Clr-Steaga4 German Unirersal Copantrw 14 Enomy 1wr'L L. REv. 1305, 1337-43 (2000). Thus, logically.
bank loans would be available only at a higher price and interest rates would rise.
*Idt at 1324-25.
8
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The Supreme Court's decision in Investment Company Institute v. Camp , and in particular, the Court's
examination of the legislative intent of the Glass-Steagall Act makes the case an important contribution to
the judicial analysis of universal banking regulation. In Camp, the Court, for the first time, addressed the
scope of permissible banking activities under Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act. The Court struck down a
regulation issued by the Comptroller of the Currency authorizing commercial banks to operate mutual
funds because the regulation was held to violate Sections 16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall. The mutual fund
plan under review called for customers to tender between $ 10,000 and $ 500,000 to a commercial bank
along with an authorization making the bank the customer's managing agent. In return, the customer was
to be given units of participation expressing the customer's proportionate interest in the fund assets. These
units of participation were freely redeemable and transferable. The Comptroller had ruled that these units
of participation were not securities within the meaning of Section 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act. The
Comptroller's contention was that this kind of bank investment fund simply made available to the small
investor the benefits of investment management that were available to large investors through the bank's
trust department. The Court rejected the Comptroller's decision and held that the units of participation in
the bank's fund were securities for the purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act. In reaching its conclusion the
Court recounted the "haZards and finanial dangers that arise when commerial banks engage in the actiities
prscihed/tbheAct"" Each of the hazards described constituted either a legislative intention to ensure that
commercial banks were held to a higher standard of care when making investments than investment banks
(safety concerns) or a legislative intention that banks should be held to a higher standard of care than other
FIs when dealing with customers (conflicts of interest concerns). The Court applied a two-step approach in
determining whether the collective investment fund constituted a security under the Glass-Steagall Act.
First, the Court looked at the literal meaning of Section 16 of the Act and decided that the combination of a
bank commingling trust funds and acting as a managing agent gave birth to an investment fund whose
activities were prohibited by the Act. Under its literal analysis, the Court concluded that Congress intended
that the word "secnriy', as used in Sections 16 and 21, should be broadly interpreted to include an interest
in an investment fund. Thus, the bank's operation of the investment fund involved the bank in the
33
underwriting, issuing, selling, and distributing of securities in violation of the Glass-Steagall Act.
Secondly, the Court reviewed the legislative history of the Act, specifically the perceived hazards that could
arise if commercial banks entered the investment banking business. The Court found that the investment
fund at issue presented the threat of the six abuses targeted by Glass-Steagall. The Court stated that "when
a bank pts isef in competition with mutualfunds, the bank must make an accommodation to the kind fground rules
that Congressfirm concluded cold not be prudent mixed with the business of commenial banking" The Court
also stated that "these are all hazardsthat are notpresentwhen a bank undertakes to purchasestockfor the account of
its individual customers or to commingle assets which it has received for a true fiduciary purpose rather than for
inestment." However, in his dissent, justice Harry Blackmun pointed out that the same subtle hazards
were present due to the atmosphere of vigorous competition in the fiduciary service industry: "Hailure or

0

401 U.S 617 (1971),

See supra text accompanying note 19.
Supra note 30, at 635.
"Id at 639.
"
Macey, sp~crnnote 20.
SStpra note 30, at 637.
SId at 638.
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misadirnture of a single trust may mushttr a threat to pubc cwfidemr among the bankk other trust benefciaries,
To sunmarize the Camp judgment
from a policy standpoint, the Court recognized that certain hazards arose when commercial banks entered
the investment banking business. t The most significant of these hazards were the close association of the
39
bank and its securities affiliate so that the poor performance of one could harm the other, the possibility
of unsound loans from the bank to customers with the understanding that the funds would then be used
to purchase the affiliate's offering, and the loss of the bank's ability to give disinterested advice.
In Boardof Gowernor v. Invusment Company Institute (IC) , the Supreme Court again utilized this fiduciary
42
distinction to uphold the Federal Reserve Board's amendment to Regulation Y . which dealt with the
scope of permissible activities of commercial banks. The challenged amendment to Regulation Y
expanded the category of activities that a bank could perform, to include services as an investment adviser
to a closed-end investment company. 3 In holding that this type of service was not prohibited by the
Glass-Steagall Act, the Court stated that "the services ofan insestment adviser ai not ssgncanty dferentfrons the
traditzonalfduciaryfunctions of banks." The Court opined that, for Glass-Steagall purposes, the closed-end
investment company question "presents an entirely different issue" from the open-ended question the
44
Court had previously faced. The Court's distinction stemmed from two factors. First, the Federal Reserve
Board had expressly prohibited commercial banks from issuing, underwriting, selling, or redeeming shares
45
of a closed-end investment company. Second, closed-end investment companies were subject to
"restrictons imposed by the Federal Reserve Board abich . . seld also preclude the promotional pressures that are
inherent in the investment banking businrss." The Court focused on the Federal Reserve Board regulations
that prohibited a bank from extending credit to, or owningan interest in, the investment company, and that
prohibited a bank from providing a list of its customers to the investment company or from distributing
prospectuses or sales literature to customers. In the light of these restrictions, the Court decided that the
hazards enumerated in Camp would not be present in the context of a bank as a closed-end company's

prpective trustrs,and evan the ammedl actidtes of the bank itsef"

'

Id at 644-645.
*Id at 630.

Court expressed concern that " Ae bak vund make it ust- fanhcr mnorfrel asaiable to those companie in whose
stack or searzits the afkor has imested or bem
othernse inhed Coqre fitd tbat banks irght even so so far as to wake
nnsaend lmr to sc-h awrpanCs' Id at 631
hi. at 632.
The

"

450 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1981).
The BHCA prohibits bank holding companies from engaging in activities that are not closely related to banking.
The Federal Reserve Board has been given the authority to allow bank holding companies to engage in business
activities that are "so iels related to hanking . . &r to he a proper incident thereto." In 1972 the Federal Reserve Board
amended its Regulation Y, thereby expanding the list of permissible commercial banking activities to permit
commercial bank holding companies and their affiliates to act as investment advisers to closed-end investment
companies.
Both closed-end investment companies and open-end investment companies (which were the subject of the
dispute in Camp) sell shares to customers and use the proceeds of such sales to purchase a portfolio of other
secunties in the open market. Banks profit from both activities in the same way, by taking a fee and distributing
the remaining revenues awong the customers on a prm m/a basis. The distinction between "closed" and "open"
ended funds is that an open-end investment company (also known as a mutual fund) is "antioasA' engqrd in the
isanace of its shams and sands ready at any tie

"

to redeem the searities as to atckh it is the issuer," while a closed-end

investment company does not stand ready to redeem its shares and only issues such shares occasionally, not
continuously. Macey, upr note 20, at 42
SAPrw note 41, at 65-66.
M4at 66.

SId at 67.

I. at 66-67.
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adviser. This conclusion by the Court constituted a judicial amendment of the Glass-Steagall Act and an
obvious departure from the previous holding in Gamp.
Thus, these two cases demonstrate that the innovative methods used by commercial banks met with a
fiduciary/trust exception developed in Camp may not
mixed response from the American judiciary. 4The
have been considered by the drafters of the Glass-Steagall Act. As a result, such an exception could have led
to the widespread use of common trust funds as mutual fund alternatives, which Congress did not
envision in the Act. Thus, judicial interpretation, in a way, enabled circumvention, or rather the dilution, of
the segregation of commercial banking and investment banking imposed by the Act.
Reasons for Acceleration towards Universal Banking
The expansion of global financial markets has been further driven by a variety of well-reported factors:
trends toward lesser government control of financial activities, including liberalization, opening of
national markets, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises; information technology that has
reduced geographic distances, quickened the pace and reduced the cost of transactions, and enabled the
rapid evolution of new financial products and techniques. Chief among those techniques is securitization,
i.e., the various ways by which financial assets increasingly become tradeable, directly or indirecdy, in liquid
markets."4 FIs are converging and are all becoming more alike. Not only has securitization eliminated
traditional intermediary functions, such as bank loans to highly rated corporations, but customer
preferences, synergies among financial products that take different forms but share economic and risk
attributes, and the need to build economies of scale have driven commercial banks to broaden the range of
products and services. Therefore, it has been observed that many commercial banks have expanded into the
capital markets activities of underwriting and dealing in securities of all kinds, as well as other traditional
investment banking activities of brokerage, mergers and acquisitions advice, and merchant banking.
However, it has been very much a two-way process as investment banks have entered traditional
commercial banking domains, including custody, retail credit, and syndicated corporate lending. The
convergence is also evident in investment management, with every type of institution - commercial and
investment banks, insurance companies, and fund managers.

"

"

*

Seeals SIA v. Board of Goenors, 104 SCt. 3003 (1984), wherein the United States Supreme Court upheld the
Federal Reserve Board's decision authorizing the acquisition of Schwab by Bank America Corp. and held that the
non-bank subsidiary of a bank holding company could discount brokerage business as an activity "closely related
to banking." The Court indicated that the discount brokerage bank holding company subsidiary was nor within
the constraints imposed by Sections 16, 21, and 32 of the Glass-Steagal Act.
Securitization of financial assets can broadly be defined as transactions in which an entity pools together loans.
accounts, or other financial rights to receive a payment in the future, and then sells the rights to those
receivables to investors in the form of securities. Jessica DeBruin, Reant Devkpments in and Lgai Imphealioss of
Aawwnhag for Samiudtaos, 1999 ANN. Suay. Ahs. L. 367, 368. Securitization is a relatively new system of
intermediation among savers/investors and borrowers/issuers, merging traditional intermediation systems of
markets and institutions. Securitization can arise when institutional intermediaries are inadequatcly performing
their functions. It can be used to bypass traditional banks and insurance companies or similar institutions that fail
to provide adequate financing or services. The United States developed securitization in the 1970s when banks
and savings and loan associations did not operate well and did not perform the functions of intermediation
effectively Tamar Frankel, Csart-Bonfer SeatiTaon: Withau Law, But Not Lawkss 8 DUKE J COMP. & INT'l. L 255,
258-59 (1998).
Michael E. Patterson, The Globa CapitalMarket What Next Conrwgena of Global Fina

377, 379 (1997).
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The development of derivative products has been, in at least two ways, one of the most powerful agents
in this process of convergence. Firstly, since derivatives are not historically identified with any particular type
of institution, all financial players have used thern, both as clients and as end-users. Secondly, and more
importantly, derivatives enable the disaggregation and repackaging of financial risks that have always been
common to all types of financial products, albeit in different forms and dealt with in different kinds of
institutions. This has enabled banks, for example, to replicate products that they have not traditionally
$2
offered, such as some types of insurance or commodity hedging. In short, derivatives have brightened
$3
the spotlight on the artificiality of segregating FIs by traditional products. On November 12, 1999,
President Bill Clinton signed financial modernization into law, known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Financial Modernization Act of 1999 C'Grarnm-Leach"). The provisions of Gramm-Leach are steps aimed
54
at removing all the regulatory barriers imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act. Thus, the United States seems
to have made the transition to universal banking, and is now in a position to dominate the global banking
industry)' It is interesting to note that the demand for universal banking in the United States was being
made for the purpose of reviving the failing commercial banking industry, whereas in India, the entire
debate on universal banking has arisen in the context of FIs desiring to convert into commercial banks.
Thus, although the discussion on the position in American law may not have a direct bearing on Indian
policy making, some of the policy concerns regarding universal banking remain the same; hence the debate
in the American context retains its relevance. India is also seeking to move towards a system of universal
banking. The recent reverse merger between Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India
(ICICI) and ICICI Bank is a reflection of this trend. But the concept of universal banking remains untested

'

"

In shon, a derivative is a contractual relationship established by two (or more) parties where payment is based on (or
derived from) some agreed-upon benchmark. The term "derivative" doesn't actually refer to a specific type of
investment vehicle. Instead, it describes a broad class of trading instruments that have no tangible worth of their own,
but "derive" their value from the claim they give their owners to some other financial asset or security. Basically, a
financial derivative is a financial instrument, the value of which is based on the value or values of one or more
underlying assets or indices of assets. Derivatives can be based on equities (stocks), debt (bonds, bills, and notes),
currencies, and even indices of these various things, such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Rnderiis lIilb Optiou.
IFST'INT MONITR, Volume II, Issue (7),July 2001, 22
Patterson, mpmnote 50.
"Id

It (1) repeals Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act to (i) remove the prohibition on banks affiliating with
securities firms and (ii) permit common officers, directors, and employees with a securities affiliate: (2) authorizes
national banks to underwrite and broker any type of insurance product permitted as of Januar 1, 1999, but prohibits
further expansion; (3) preserves the right of national banks and their affiliates to sell insurance on an agency basis; (4)
expands permissible non-banking activities for financial holding companies to include complementary activities as
prescribed by the Federal Reserve; (5) prohibits a combination of banking and securities firms where it woult result
in an undue concentration of economic resources in the commercial banking and investment markets; (6) gives
foreign banks national treatment while repealing certain provisions that allow certain foreign banks to conduct
securities activities prohibited to domestic banks; (7) permits a company that is not a bank holding company, that
becomes a financial holding company after the date of enactment, to retain and continue any business not otherwise
permissible for financial holding companies, if it was engaged in that business as of September 30, 1999; and (8)
establishes the Federal Reserve as the first among equa1S as related to all financial services regulators.
Nance and Singhofrupro note 28, at 1330,
Among the benefits of Gramm-Leach is a clearing away of regulatory obstacles that will allow banks, insurance
companies, and securities firms to create "finanidl services supermarkets", offering to customers in one place a wide
array of financial products and services rather than the relatively limited.offerings allowed under prior law United
States financial services companies with their tremendous reach and market power will stand to benefit from this
convergence and grow larger
12
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as yet in the Indian context. The next part of the paper seeks to address some of the regulatory issues and
the larger economic policy concerns that may arise as Indian banks and FIs make the transition to universal
banking.

The ICICI-ICICI Bank Merger
Leading Indian term lenderM , ICICI Ltd., and the ICICI Bank recently agreed to merge to create the
country's first universal bank, a one-stop shop for financial services. With total assets of Rs. 950 billion
($19.8 billion), the merged entity will be second only to the state-owned State Bank of India, which has
17
assets of Rs. 3.16 trillion. The bank will have a capital base of Rs. 95 billion, 8,300 employees and a large
nationwide branch network. ICICI was founded 47 years ago; ICICI founded ICICI Bank eight years ago,
and now owns a 46 per cent stake in it. The merger represents a culmination in the process of financial
services convergence. The term refers to the blurring of distinctions between traditionally segregated
financial service providers. This merger provides an ideal platform for a comprehensive discussion on the
implications of universal banks in India. Such a discussion would necessitate an understanding of the
underlying economic policy, regulatory and structural issues.

Universal Banking in the context of the Indian economic scenario
'The availabity and access to finance can be a cmrial ifluence on the economic entitlements that economic agents am
prachical able to secure. This appes all the wayffrom large enterprises (in mich hundreds of thousands of people may
work) to tiny establishments that rerf
on microcredit."
Amartya Sen, 1999
Any debate on the adoption of a universal banking model must rest on a firm economic rationale,
especially in the context of a country like India where, despite repeated recognition of the structural features
of both real and financial sectors, no attempt has been made to link ultimate goals with instruments of
monetary and credit policy An example of distortions in the financial sector in India can be seen in the
context of the recent imbroglio in the urban co-operative banking sector. The issue relating to the dual
control of these banks by the respective State authorities as well as the RBI, has raised intense debate, and it
is high time that this issue is resolved in a pragmatic manner -possibly through legislative changes in the
State and Central Acts. It is also important to align the co-operative banking sector with the rest of the
financial system, and improve internal governance of these banks to avert the recurrence of crises in the
future. Such a disjointed approach is partly responsible for the prevalence of many similar distortions in the

" Term

lending institutions are

lenders

in ihe long term assets markets such

as housing finance

and other

infrastructure projects such as electricit% telecommunications and other utilities. Set Univerralpreseotin, al http://
wwwblonnet.com/businessline/2001/10/31/stories/043121ed.htm (last visited October 22, 2002).
SeeICCT, ICICI Bank merger toanale pbmarwed,at
http://uww.rediff.com/money/2001/oct/27icicil.htm (last visited November 11, 2001).
AuAnIA
SEN, DEVEIOPMENT As FREEDoi 39 (1999).
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financial system.s Therefore, any decision on the adoption of any particular model of banking system by a
country must be rational, weighing in mind the various costs and benefits involved.
Arguments advanced in favour of Universal Banking
The first argument that is advanced by proponents of universal banking is that of efficiency. It is argued
that universal banking augments bank efficiency by allowing them to reap the benefits of economies of
scale and scope that emerge from providing related financial services that may require comparable skills
without materially increasing costs. In the United States, the segregation of commercial banking from the
business of investment banking by virtue of the provisions in the Glass-Steagall Act led to commercial
banks attempting to circumvent the rule by forming bank holding companies, which were allowed to
61
control both commercial banking and investment banking subsidiaries. Subsequently, it has been argued
that the bank holding company structure may be an inefficient way to organize synergistic financial
52
services. This is because the costs of organizing and maintaining several different corporate structures act
as prohibitively high entry barriers for many small banks that wish to enter lucrative bank-related
businesses, such as underwriting municipal revenue bonds and offering real estate services. Many banks
expect to reduce operating costs significantly by switching from the holding company form to an operating

'

One of the major weaknesses of the financial sector reforms is the disproportionate emphasis placed on the
development of the capital market. Commercial banks have been induced to lend to customers for investment in the
stock market, Banks themselves have been permitted, up to a limit, to invest in equities. Stock markets are thrown
open to foreign financial institutions (FFIs) and there is convertibility of the rupee for the FFIs both on current and
capital account. More recently, dividends have been exempted from individual income tax. This is discriminatory
because savings with banks do attract income-tax. Mutual funds have, therefore, flourished at the cost of banks
because of migration of private savings to mutual funds. Thus, the flow of funds within the financial system has also
been

distorted.

See N.A.Mujumdar,

Finandial

refirn

and groath -

Poly derdmreas need correction, at

http://

wwwrblonnet com/businessline/2001/03/15/stories/041520ma.htm (last visited October 22, 2002).
Amy Chunyan Wu, PRC Cmmnenrial Banking Syteam: Is Unirerval Baking a Beler Modeft, 37 Cou M.
J. TRA%ss%AT' L. 623
(1999), Without doubt, there are synergies to be had in the arrangement. Enterprises that need long-term project
finance also need short-term working capital funds- Hence, an entity that has access to both long term and short term
funds can conveniently set itself up as a single window of capital to a prospective borrower, and thus leverage its
credit appraisal and other infrastructural investments for greater profits. Similarly, the investment management skills
of a term lending institution or for that matter a commercial banking outfit could be leveraged across a larger volume
of investible funds that a conglomerate structure spanning both businesses offers. Cross selling of other financial

I
(2

products involving commercial borrowers and the extended family of employees in the borrower enterprises is
another possibility In the Indian context, the synergistic benefits acquire a new meaning with the skewed portfolio
structure of these institutions. Commercial banks have an expanded exposure in government securioes - far more
than what the Reserve Bank considers prudent. In contrast, the term lending institutions have a preponderance of
loan assets, some of which is of doubtful quality A combined entity would provide a reasonable balance to the asset
portfolio thereby promoting a more secure financial sector in the economy. See sznm note 56,
A. J.Herbert III, Requiem on the Glas-SteagallAct: Tradg the Embkelian and Crrent Slats of Bank Imshmenl in Bkerage
Actniier,63Tn. LRv. 157 (1988).
The structure of bank holding companies presented the danger of serious conflicts of interest that threatened bank
soundness and skewed the impartial allocation of credit in the United States economy. Banks could aid their nonbank
affiliates with loans, grant credit to preferred customers of its nonbank subsidiaries, or deny credit to competitors of its
nonbank affiliates. Other problems included access to confidential information by both bank and nonbank officials,
pressures on the nonbank affiliate to skew its business decisions in favor of the bank affiliame, and the granting of
excessive bank dividends to finance nonbank growth. Hence, banks and their holding companies were regulated to
promote their safety and soundness, to avoid conflicts of interest, and to prevent the concentration of economic power
and the resultant potentisl for abuse and decreased competition. Logically, therefore, bank holding companies became
an expensive structure for organization of financial service& See Brloniof Ga. of 1br Fed Re. Sys. v Imarimeot Ca List, 45t
11S. 46, 66 (1981) and Inestment Ca lsst v. Camp, 401 US. 617, 630-33 (1971). See Ralph P DeSanto, Prdtd Eywainon in Te
Banksqg lhisda AnArauis and Rezidon of Section 4(){) of Ibe Bank Flko~s Company Ast, 53 FoaAia L. Rev. 1127, 1147-50
(1985).
14

Delopment of UndwrsalBanking
63

64

5

subsidiary form. The argument being advanced is that the shift from the holding company to the
operating subsidiary structure entails a decrease in transaction costs for large commercial banks and an
increase in product offerings of banks , both of which translate into higher profits. In this respect, the
move toward universal banking will increase efficiency. In India, there are presently 297 Scheduled
Commercial Banks comprising the State Bank of India and its subsidiaries, nationalized banks, private
sector banks, regional rural banks, and foreign banks. Therefore, it can be safely argued that any policy in
favour of adopting universal banking will lead to a spate of bank mergers (on the lines of the ICICI-ICICI
Bank merger) and possible arrangements between banks, insurance companies, and securities underwriters,
which should logically lead to banks gaining in size, thereby reaping the benefits of economies of scale, and
lower operational and transaction costs.
The second argument in favour of universal banking is that it entails an oligopolistic structure in the
banking industry, meaning that there will be fewer banks to monitor, and hence that the cost of regulation
will reduce. Since all institutions could provide the same services, regulators and FIs would only have to
concern themselves with one set of rules. One regulatory agency could monitor the whole financial system.
This system would reduce the time and uncertainty associated with reporting requirements and regulations
found in a multi-agency regulatory scheme like that of the United States. Although this argument does not
address the regulatory savings enjoyed as a result of specialization among regulators, efficiencies realized
through reducing overlapping jurisdiction might make up for inefficiencies due to decreased
specialization."
The third argument advanced in favour of universal banking is that if commercial banks are allowed to buy
and sell stocks, they will be able to diversify their portfolio of assets, thereby reducing risk. It would be
inappropriate to suggest an outright ban on banks investing in securities because of the fear of the
attendant failure that they carry with them. The same threat of failure can also be present in the lending
operations of a bank. Therefore, even if a bank's investment in securities were to fail, the effect would be
that deposits will simply flow to those banks that give sound investment advice. There is an assumption
that a prudent bank would make diversified investments so as to obtain the maximum returns on its
investment and that in the process, there would also be a diversification in its portfolio leading to a
reduction in its risk.
Proponents of universal banking argue that it leads to improved corporate governance in the industry by
putting banks in a position to monitor the actions of management. The value and depth of the bank-client
aIn the United States, effective from December 31, 1996. national banks may engage in a broader range of activities
through subsidiaries than the Comptroller of Currency permits within the banks themselves. The new Operating
Subsidiary Rule provides:
"national bank may estabish or acquire an opernng subsidary M conduct, or may conduct in an eairlng operatag subsidiary, acities
that are part of or incidental to the business of bankiag, as determined y the Comptroler of the Currrcs pursuant to 12 U.S.C 24
(Sentb), and other arbies permnshie for nahnal bunks or lbeir subsdaries under other statutory authori."
See12 C.F.R 5.34 (1997). Where a bank or its operating subsidiary offers a variety of services, including insurance and
securities underwriting, there is a possibility of increased efficiency and this thereby enhance the ability of [he

pricing mechanism to direct financial services to their most productive users.
Note, The NewAmedian UniorsalBank, 110 Hanv. L Rv. 1310,1321,1322 (1997)
Transaction costs decrease because activities such as insurance and securities underwriting which were hitherto
required to be carried out under a separate entity within the bank holding company umbrella can now be directly
carried out by a bank itself by creating an operating subsidiary.
" The bank can now offer various products such as insurance and securities to the customer in a one-stop financial
supermarket.
" William L. Horton, Jr., The Perils of Unimral Banking in Canmal and Eastern Erpe, 35 VA. J. T'n-r' L 683, 688 (1995).
"
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relationship in a universal banking system makes it more probable that banks will aid their client enterprises
in times of adversity and rice versa. However, over a wide range of corporate governance issues, banks
align themselves with the interests of incumbent management and oppose the interests of shareholders.
Since both managers and banks have fixed claims on their firms' cash flows, they care far less about
maximizing their firms' potential upside performance than about minimizing potential downside
7D
performance. Therefore, the impact of universal banking on corporate governance practices in economies
that rely more on a vibrant banking system rather than securities markets, for investments in industry, can
be both positive and negative. The quantum of investment by a universal bank in a corporation maybe
such that it cannot blind itself to the interests of other shareholders in a company, and it may have to work
towards maximizing their firms' potential upside performance. Moreover, banks are of a size that permits
them to absorb losses from securities activities or failing firms.
Commercial banks, especially large ones, have customer lists that can be used to cross-sell securities
products. Large commercial banks would also have an extensive network of branches that could be used for
the selling efforts. These combined sales advantages would improve the placement power of a bank's
securities affiliates. The affiliates consequently become more attractive underwriters than non-affiliated
securities firms. Commercial banks can also utilize their distribution network to sell all types of insurance,
particularly life insurance, to their traditional customers. Insurance companies are experienced in designing
certain complex financial products and offer financial products for placing savings that private customers
find particularly appealing, such as retirement funds or si le-premium insurance policies. Thus, a
universal bank can be a one-stop financial shop for a customer.
Arguments against Universal Banking
It would be useful to now examine some of the forceful arguments raised against the adoption of a
universal banking model. If banks are allowed to invest in securities or to underwrite securities, there is a
fear that banks may end up lending to small firms if large reputable firms increasingly raise funds through
issuing securities. This tendency is more pronounced for small banks, if large banks increase their lending

* The reason why universal banks can improve corporate governance in industry is that they are in a position to
monitor the actions of the management of borrowing corporations. The banks are highly efficient monitors
because they enjoy informational advantages due to their representation on boards of directors and their close
lending arrangements with large firms. As a result, the banks in universal banking systems are very important
players in the market for corporate control Further, by allowing substantial equity participation by banks in
individual businesses, universal banking schemes may also increase the likelihood of more efficient private
economic adjustments of ailing companies. Since the lender bank would have an ownership interest in the
business, and therefore, a subordinated residual claim in case of bankruptcy, it might be more likely to bear the
costs of longer adjustment periods than would an otherwise disinterested tender with a prior claim. To the extent
that the longer period of adjustment will increase the likelihood of rehabilitating the troubled business, this
flexibility would likely be beneficial to the economy. Horton Jr., sra" note 68, at 688.
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Cporate Gronea and Cosmriai Banking A omparathv Examinaion oJ
Germany Japan, and the United Staor, 48 STAN, L. RvY. 73, 82 (1995).
Y, V Reddy, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India, Address at the Seminar on Harmonising the Role and

Operations of Development Financial Institutions and Banks, (une 28, 1999).
72The client's first contact may be by walking in the door of a brck and mortar establishment and asking for a
checking account, but from that point forward, every banking, insurance, and securities whim is anticipated and
the proper product provided at the right time through the most advantageous channel. And this relationship can
carry beyond personal finance. If this same person decides to start a business, the institution can offer the sane
services, except on a corporate level, essentially anticipating when the owner may desire a commercial loan,
business insurance, or investment products. See Crete SreNg is in the Terhnokgy, at http://wwwinsurance-canada.ca/
relations/other/VirtCRM200201.php (last visited October 22, 2002).
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and securities businesses with large clients. This suggests that banks could face a higher default ratio on
the average bank credits, creating a more dire need to improve their internl risk management system, which
would, therefore, entail significant operational costs for banks. Thus, an emphasis on securities and other
financial activities of banks cannot be undertaken unless risk management systems in the process of
lending are strong. Further, the legislative mechanisms governing recovery of debts will need to be
strengthened so as to check the definult ratio on bank credits.
Secondly, financial conglomeration may crowd out small firms because it may encourage banks to shift
toward bigger banks by acquiring smaller and weaker banks in order to exploit economies of scale and
diversification benefits. As a result, the number of small banks would be lesser and thus, small firms may
find it more difficult to obtain funds from banks. As the size of banks becomes larger through financial
conglomeration, there is a distinct possibility of concentration ofpower in the hands of a few large banks
in the banking sector. This may deter the development of capital markets, since large banks tend to be
reluctant to initiate financial innovation. Fears of concentration of power can be addressed by competition
laws, which are aimed at preserving the competitive environment of markets, and preventing the
concentration of market power in the hands of few entities. Therefore, this may not be such a hindrance
considering that a Competition Bill is already on the anvil.73 Conflicts of interest between banks and

"
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Sayuri Shirsi, Searching for New Regulator Frameworks for the Intermediate Finandal Strucure in PostCritis Ana, at http://
fci.whartonupenn.edu/fic/papers/adbi02.htmil (last visited on December 10, 2001). If large banks increase their
securities business, only smaller players in the market will require loans and other bank credits and hence, they
would approach smaller banks for that as the cost of obtaining credit will normally be lower in a all bank.
Correspondingly, small banks will face a threar or problem in recovering their loans if their risk management
systems are not sound.
Another cost of universal banking is decreased compenton in the market for banking services. Not only do huge
universal banks tend to squeeze smaller competitors out of their markets, but also, and perhaps more importantly,
connections are formed between the banks and industry. These mutually reinforcing connections, manifested in
cross- representation on the boards of directors, eliminate potential clients from the financial services market. The
fact that some of the most lucrative financial services contracts are essentially off the market likely provides a
substantial barrier to entry for new banks. This problem, however, is not peculiar to the banking industry and a
state might be able to address it appropriately through antitrust laws. Horton Jr. Japm note 68, at 691.
The Competition Bill, 2001, at present pending in the Indian Parliament, seeks to repeal the Monopolies and
Restricve Trade Practices Act, 1969 ("MRTP Act"), which has become obsolete in view of developments in the
Indian and global markets. It endeavours to shift the focus from restricting monopolies to promoting fair
competition, so that the Indian market is equipped to compete with the markets worldwide. It seeks to dissolve
the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission ("MRTP Commission") and to transfer the cases
pending before the MRTP Commission, other than those relating to unfair trade practices ("UTPs"), to the
Competition Commission of India ("CCI), a quasi-judicial body, which will advocate competition and prevent
practices having an adverse effect on competition. Clause 3(1) of the Competition Bill, 2001, prohibits enterprises
and persons from entering into agreements with respect to production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition
or control of goods, or provision of services, which may have an appreciable adverse effect on competition. An
agreement is deemed to hinder competition if it directly or indirectly determines purchase or sale prices; limits
or controls the production, supply, markets, technical development, investment or provision of services; shares
the market, source of production, or provision of services, by allocating the geographical area of the market, the
type of goods or services, the number of customers in the market, or in any other similar manner; or results in
bid rigging or collusive bidding.
Any agreement containing the foregoing restrictions is void under Clause 3(2) of the Competition Bill, 2001.
Further, under Clause 3(4), agreements relating to tie-in arrangements, exclusive supply agreements, exclusive
distribution agreements, refusal to deal and resale price maintenance, between enterprises or persons at different
levels of the production chain in different markets, are void if they cause an appreciable adverse effect on
competition. See Competition Bill, 2001 - A
Cridque, at httpt//wwwmajmudarindia.com/frames/articles/
CompetitionLaw/CompBillOlhtm (last visited October 22, 2002).
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investors may emerge, as demonstrated by the case that banks attempt to underwrite securities of troubled
76
borrowers where the proceeds of the issues are used to pay off banks' own loans to the firms. The
presence of such conflicts may weaken investor confidence in the capital market and thus discourage the
market to develop further.
Thus, we see that there are several pros and cons in adopting a universal banking model and the decision to
do so will depend on the peculiar economic and legal circumstances governing a nation at a particular point
of time. Having examined the pros and cons of universal banking, the next part will seek to address the
various regulations in Indian banking law and policy that act as either enabling/constricting factors in the
development of the universal banking model in the Indian context.

The Legal Regime Applicable to Commercial Banks and Financial Institutions
in India: An analysis
In India, the functioning of commercial banks is regulated by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Section 6
(d) of the Act states that
"In addition to the business of banking, a banking company may engage in any one or more of thefolloningforms of
business, name/y
(d) the effecdng, insuring,guaranteeing, underwridng,parapadagin managing and carrying out of any issue, pubk
orpntite, of state, mkniapalor other loans or of other shares, stock, debenture, or debenture stock of any compain ,
corporation orassociationand the lending of mongfor thepurpose of any such issue."
This provision makes it clear that commercial banks in India have not been subjected to the restriction
against investment in securities like the American commercial banks. Hence, Indian commercial banks have
been relatively free to invest in securities of any nature. It is another matter that Indian commercial banks
have not been provided the opportunity to exploit this enabling provision to the hilt, as the industry in
India was heavily regulated at least till 1991. Therefore, the entire debate on the legal regime required for

"

Universal banking may also create a great moral hazard. The fact that banks and their directors have access to large
amounts of information about their corporate clients creates a great incentve to engage in insider trading. Much
of the concern with insider trading, however, is not with trading in the insider's own firm; it is, rather with the
illegal acquisition and use of information concerning other firms. As a result universal bankers may not be an;
more susceptible than anyone else to the incentives to trade on inside information. Furthermore, it is not clear
that this insider trading should be avoided. There may be a reason to desire such activity if it provides an
efficient signal to the market. Horton Jr., spra note 68, at 692.
IndiAs financial sector was heavily regulated for a long period. Interest rates were administered. Deployment of
credit was largely directed by the authonties Banks were the captive subscribers to government securities under
statutory arrangement. The secondary market of government securities was dormant. Both the money and capital
markets were underdeveloped. The foreign exchange market was extremely thin, mainly due to stringent
restrictions under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act ("FERR). A comprehensive package of reform measures
recommended by the Narasimham Committee in 1991 became the starting point of gradual deregulation of the
financial sector. The reform process since then has rolled forward in several directions. An important objective
of reform has been to develop the various segments of the financial market into an integrated one, so that their
inter-lnkages can reduce arbitrage opporunities, help achieve a higher level of efficiency in marker operation,
and increase the effectivcncss of monetary policy in the economy. Some of the precise policy reforms pursuing
these objectives have been the gradual process of dismanding of various price and non-price controls in the
financial system, developing and strengthening an active market for government securities, and putting in place an
appropriate mnstitutional and legal system that would supervise various segments of financial market operations.
Se BK. Bhoi & &C. Dhal, Inegration of Finomial Markets in India: An Eoiind Ebration, al http://www.rbi.orgin/
index.dil/6242?OpenStoryTextArea?fromdate=04/07/99&todate-04/07/99&slsecid=7&s2secid=0&secid-7/7/
O&arChivemode=1 (ast visited October 22, 2002).
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universal banking in India centres on the issue of the regulatory compliance required by an FI to convert
itself to a universal bank. There are no legal or regulatory restrictions on adoption of universal banking in
India. There are, however, prudential requirements , as also entry conditions applicable to all banks. In
this context, the structure adopted by the RBI in its circular issued to the Chief Executive Officers of AllIndia Term-lending and Refinancing Institutions in listing out the salient regulatory issues that have to
be addressed by FIs for conversion into a universal bank has been borrowed. In addition, the impact of
some of these requirements from the viewpoint of the customers, as also from the perspective of the
capabilities of FIs to meet these requirements, is sought to be analyzed.
Reserve requirements
Compliance with the Cash Reserve Ratio ("CRR") and Statutory Liquidity Ratio ("SLR") requirements
(under Section 42 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, and Section 24 of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949, respectively) would be mandatory fir a financial institution after its conversion into a universal bank.
Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR)
Section 18 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, mandates a bank to maintain a minimum three per cent
cash reserve of the total of its demand and time liabilities in India at any point of time. This has placed
hurdles on FIs desiring to convert to universal banks. The argument of the FIs has been that conversion
into a bank without relaxation in the CRR would definitely affect the bottom-line of the institution. This is
reflected in the fact that ICICI has mentioned this clearly to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC),
the securities market regulator in the United States: "The income, prfjtabily and market risk proile of aty
merged nniversalbank may therefore be adverse affected by the impact of these regulatory requirements. This may result
in lower income in initialyears after conversion.'' It has also said, "comersion oflCICI into a universal bank con/d
ipact the equitysharesprice and theADSsprice. "
On the other hand, it has been the contention of senior RBI officials that since the business of banking is a
far more sensitive activity than the activities carried out hitherto by FIs, the requirement of a CRR has to be
52
higher for the banking sector. The reason for this greater sensitivity in the banking business is because
banks are a part of the payment system and can issue cheques, and because they participate in the inter-bank
market. Hence, banks are required to ensure a minimum level of cash reserves at any point of time so as to
satisfy any payment requirements of depositors. However, for FIs, there are two practical impediments,
zi!Z., backlog of liabilities in a financial institution on which reserve requirements have not been provided;
and the relatively high reserve requirements, particularly the CRR. Traditionally, development financial
institutions have not been required to maintain a CRR as they have not been envisaged as being a part of
the payment system. Their role has been to provide Finance for long term projects and their return on
investments has also been long-term in nature. Hence, the transition from being a financial institution to a

" Spa note 12.
" See DBS.FID Na C-24 / 01.02.00 / 2000-2001, Approach to Universal Banking at http:// wwwrbi.org.in (last visited
*
51

'

November 11, 2001).
Sangita Mehta, UnienaITnhs,THE Ecosomic TilES, October 17, 2001, at 7.
Id

Indian banks must maintain a CRR of 7.5 per cent and SLR of 25 per cent, and 40 per cent of their loans should
be to the agricultural and the small industry sectors. The CRR is that portion of banks' deposits that it must
maintain in cash, while the SLR is that portion of liabilities that the banks must hold in the form of government
securities. See supm note 57.
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universal bank has cast an onerous responsibility on them to satisfy all banking regulations. Needless to
84
say, once the CRR is brought down by the RBI from the current 5,5 per cent to, say, the statutory
minimum of three per cent, or less, FIs would find it less cumbersome to satisfy the preconditions for
becoming a universal bank. Thus, Fis should Find it easier to move towards universal banking in future, as
reserve requirements are brought down.
Statutory Liquid Ratio
Section 24 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, imposes the requirement of a SLR, ICICI had
petitioned the RBI to relax these reserve requirements to enable a smooth conversion of FIs to universal
banks at least for a period of the first five years, and had instead proposed an incremental increase of SLR
and CRR over a time frame of five to seven years to bring them at par with other banks. However, the
Bombay High Court on April 11, 2002, cleared the scheme of amalgamation, including the swap ratio,
proposed by ICICI, which envisages the financial institution merging with its banking subsidiary, ICICI
Bank. The group was internally prepared and ready to comply with all regulatory requirements as soon as
the final approval came through. The merged entity required a CRR of about Rs. 4,500 crore and an SLR of
about Rs. 23,000 crore. If the RBI had determined that ICICI could not meet the CRR and SLR
requirements, despite the clearance from the Bombay High Court, the merger would have fallen through.
ICICI did manage to mobilize these resources, but the fact remains that reserve requirements have cast an
87
onerous burden on the universal banking aspirations of several other FIs.
Restriction on investments
A financial institution with equity investment in companies in excess of 30 per cent of the paid-up share
capital of that company or 30 per cent of its own paid-up share capital and reserves, whichever is less, on its
conversion into a universal bank, would need to divest such excess holdings to secure compliance with the

'
"

*

Universalisation implies the elimination of the distinction between the Development Financial Institutions
("DPIs") and the banks; and the market segmentation that currently exists between banking and development
finance. At present, the DFIs and the banks operate in different segments of the financial market. The DFIs
finance long-term investment requirements, and the banks the short-term investment and production
requirements. Both the banks and the DFlis would be looking to inter-mediate in a big way at the other end of
the market where they-are
less dominant now. Some of them also mar diversify into insurance and other
related areas. The cost of funds differentiates the DFIs from the banks. The DFIs incur higher costs for
mobilising long-term finance. Banks, however, do not, as of now, mobilise substantial deposit resources with
maturities in excess of five years (only 11.7 per cent of deposits have maturities of more than five years),
limiting their ability to extend long-term loans. This has resulted in consortium arrangements between the DFs
and the banks so they can take care of the total credit needs of any project. However, there is conflict of
interest between the DFIs and the banks over security and apportioning repayments when the borrowing unit
is unable to maintain its repayments schedule.
See N. Srinivasan, Uniersal banking, for whom?, a http://
www.lonnet.com/businessline/2000/08/11/storics/041108ju.htm
(last visited October 22, 2002).
CR
riwe, at http://wwwhinduonnet.com/thchindu/2002/01/17/storis
See RBI
to more
to 3 p..
7
20020117001 1400.htn (last visited January 3, 2002).
YV Reddy, supra note 71.
Section 24 mandates every banking company to maintain in India in cash, gold, or unencumbered approved
securities, valued at a price not exceeding the current market price, an amount which shall not at the close of
business on any day be less than 20 per cent of the total of its demand and time liabilities in India.
The reserve requirements were made mandatory for all development financial institutions despite the main
recommendations of the Khan Working Group for Harmonising the Role and Operations of DFIs and Banks,
which clearly recommended that:
i) The application of CRR should be confined to cash and cash-like instruments. CRR should be brought down
progressively within a time-bound frame to international levels.
ii) It may be useful to consider phasing out SLR in line with international practice. Supm note 79.
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provisions of Section 19(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, which prohibits a bank from holding shares in
a company in excess of these limits. The effect of this provision is that universal banking is already
permitted in India, albeit at a restricted level. Such a restriction is valid.because it achieves the objective of
diversification of portfolio and yet spreads the risk appropriately enough to insulate the bank from market
failure. Thus, while universal banking is encouraged, safeguards such as the one provided for in Section
19(2) ensure that the benefits of universal banking outweigh the disadvantages.
Branch network
A financial institution, after its conversion into a bank, would also be required to comply with the extant
branch licensing policy of RBI under which the new banks are required to locate at least 25 per cent of their
88
total number of branches in semi-urban and rural areas. It is submitted that, from a purely marketoriented perspective, the branch licensing policy of the RBI would act as a disincentive to FIs seeking to
convert to universal banks, as such a policy would restrict the banks' freedom to channelize its
investments in areas where it would gain maximum returns - the assumption being that semi-urban and
rural customers do not have the same purchasing power. This would be so because an anticipated result
of the universalization of banking is the expansion of banks and diversification into new financial and
para-banking services. The business focus of the large entities that would emerge would be on profitable
lines, such as trade finance, credit cards, consumer finance, foreign exchange dealings, treasury and stock
market operations, where the payback period is short and risks are less compared to the traditional project
and working capital financing. With increased growth, there would be a marked reluctance to enter the
smaller end of retail banking The small borrowers, especially in the rural areas, would find it difficult to
access the bank's services as they may not be significant to the banks' business volumes or profits.
Hence, from a rural perspective, the above restriction would be favourable as the supply of micro credit for
the poor will be enhanced.

Stym note 79.
Srinivasan, sipm note 83.

Apart from the reductions in the number of rural branches of Scheduled Commercial Banks from 35.008 in
March, 1995, to 32,000 in March, 2001, or from 56.2 per cent to 49 per cent of the total, the proportions of rural
deposits and credit in the aggregate bank deposits and credit have fallen during the same period from 15.3 per
cent to 14.7 per cent and from 12.7 per cent to 10.1 per cent, respectively. There has been also a sharp reduction
in the credit-deposit ratios of rural bank branches from 49.1 per cent to 40.2 per cent in contrast to an official
prescription of 60 per cent. The rendering of micro credit for the poor in such a constricted environment
institutionally is sure to be all the more difficult. Secondly, the share of agriculture in total bank credit was 13 per
cent as at the end of March, 1994, and dwindled to 9.3 per cent by March, 2000. Likewise, the share of artisans and
village industries and all other small-scale industries together has fallen from 12 per cent to 10.6 per cent. Looking
at it differently, the share of all institutional categories constituting the btr-bod sAco? (i c, other than the public
sector and private corporate sector) significantly came down from 54 per cent in March, 1994, to 37 per cent in
March, 2000. See EPW Research Foundation, StAcherml Deienoration of Banking Dewkpment, Ecosic AND POUTicA
WEEKiY, November 24, 2001 at 4331-4332.
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Priority sector lending
On conversion of a financial institution to a universal bank, the obligation for lending to the priority
91
sector up to a prescribed percentage of their net bank credit would also become applicable to it. In this
context, it is essential to note that FIs in India have been demanding an inclusion of infrastructure lending
within the meaning of the "priority sector". But this may compel the RBI to make this applicable to banks
also. Loans to one infrastructure project would be around Rs. 50 crores to Rs 500 crores, while advances
under the existing priority sector may be small amounts below Rs. 2 lakhs. Effectively, a loan with one
infrastructure project could cover a chunk of the priority sector requirement, normally spread over
hundreds of borrowers. 3 Thus, this would again lead to a constriction in credit to smaller customers, and
therefore, may not be a positive development. It would also be a case of placing all the eggs in one basket,
and therefore, there is a danger that if the infrastructure project were to fail on account of an3' externality or
due to its unfeasibility, the bank would face a serious crisis. Thus, this demand of the Fis may not meet
with approval from the RBI.

Conclusion: How should India make the Transition towards a Universal Banking
Model?
It should be recognized that while the movement towards universal banking will foster stability and efficiency
in the financial system, it cannot, by itself, provide a viable or sustainable solution to the operational problems
of individual institutions arising from low capitalization, high level of non-performing assets, large assetliability mismatches, liquidity, etc. As stated earlier, a foreseeable consequence of universal banking is that the
business focus of the large entities that would emerge would be on profitable lines, such as trade finance, credit
cards, consumer finance, foreign exchange dealings, and treasury and stock market operations, where the
94
payback period is short and risks are lesser, compared to the traditional project and working capital financing
With increased growth, there could be a marked indifference of commercial banks towards the retail-banking
segment. The small borrowers, especially in the rural areas, would find it difficult to access the banks' services, as
they may not be significant to the banks' business volumes or profits. Therefore, while recognizing the fact that
banks are trying to achieve critical mass so as to compete effectively on a global level, universal banking should be
regulated to some extent. The regulation can be imposed by maintaining agriculture and small-scale industries
within the framework of priority sector lending, and by mandating priority sector obligations on the new
universal banks as well. This would ensure that while universal banks are driven by profit margins and volumes,
they would still be obligated to observe their developmental commitments. Regulators should also ensure that
lax enforcement of banking laws does not act as an enabling factor for banks to indulge in excessive speculative
activities. While this may come across as a protectionist measure, it is better to be safe than sorry. Even the
United States, which proclaims to be the most liberal economy in the world, took as many as 66 years to accept

The nationalization of major commercial banks in 1969 and 1980 altered the ownership pattern in favour of the
public sector and provided wide ranging powers to the Government to influence the banking policy and orientation.
At the time of nationalization, the socio-economic objectives were explicitly laid down and the banks were asked to
contribute to the maximum possible extent towards the economic and social development of the country It was
realized that the traditional banking ethics were not compatible with the needs of economic development, and that
balanced development was not possible without strengthening the hold of commercial banks in the backward and
neglected areas, Accordingly, all Commercial Banks have a priority sector lending commitment of 40%.
Mebta, sugpro note 80.
SIdn
'~Srinivasan,
sqpm note 83.
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universal banking in its most liberal form. India, on the other hand is still a developing economy. India's stock
markets are not as sophisticated as those in the United States, and the corporate governance mechanisms in
India leave a lot to be desired. It may not be a conducive atmosphere as yet for universal banking to flourish in
India. With the liberalized regime for investment flows from abroad, there would be requirements of
complementary domestic financing from banks and Fis. Project-based lending skills will be necessary in the
next five years, going by the spate of Foreign Investment Promotion Board ("FIPB") approvals. It is nor
certain as to whether this has been factored into the sequencing of the policy framework to harmonize the
financial system. The importance of project finance for industries, the nascent stage of the debt market, and
the absence of project appraisal capabilities with banks and, likewise, the absence of exposure of the FIs to
banking services and, finally, the need for evolving a regulatory and supervisory framework for such
transformed institutions - these have all been correctly emphasized repeatedly by the RBI as a matter of caution
in moving to the system of universal banking.
Furthermore, any move towards universal banking would require increased co-ordination between the
various regulators in the financial services sector. It is increasingly recognized that, for a regulator to take a
holistic view of the financial system, there needs to be some agency that feels that the entire financial system
97
is its responsibility. The specialist regulators may individually be doing an excellent job in the areas they
supervise. However, there are critical areas that remain untouched. There could also be an insufficient
98
appreciation of the linkages between various entities within the financial services sector. Therefore, a
trend towards a unified regulatory authority or a super-regulator for financial services such as banking,

"
"

"

"

Y.V. Reddy, supra note 71.
Supra note 79.
The traditional method of regulating financial services is the "entity" approach in which the regulator regulates
everything that the "entity" does. Under this approach, there is a regulator for banks, one for insurance companies,
one for stockbrokers, etc. However, the fragmented structure of the regulation of financial services was based on
sectoral divisions, which is becomingly increasingly outdated and, as such, does not respond well to dynanic markers.
Traditionally, financial regulation has been national or regional. The globalization of financial services has thrown a
challenge to the traditonal paradigm of regulation. The development of the Internet as a mode for delivery of
financial services further blurs borders and markets. Increasing coordination is, therefore, a necessity txiay, Thus, it is
felt that it would help matters tremendously if a single nodal agency has the mandate to negotiate. MstNs CHAKLWARTS,
REGun oR ScTLURE FoR FrANGo.SEcro EBatcixN Tswns 4-6(2001).
An illustration of the insufficient linkages between the various players in the financial system could be seen in
the urban cooperative banks scam in India in 2001. The Rgistrars of Cooperatives (ROCs) of different states
formed a joint regulator for both urban and rural banks in the cooperative sector. While the RBI was concerned
with the banking function performed by these cooperauve societies, the management control rested with the
Central or State government. This dual control adversely affected the supervision of both the RBI and NABARD
over instutions in this sector This can be one of the major reasons for the failure of the RBI to detect the
Madbavpura Mercantile Bank scam until it colapsed and ran up losses of over Rs 1,000 crore The funds of
Madharpura Mercantile Bank were found to have been used by Ketan Parekh to indulge in speculaive activities
on The Stock Exchange, Mumbai. Chakravarty, supra note 97, at 9-
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insurance, securimes, pensions and/or mutual funds, is emerging across several jurisdictions.' Thus, any
move towards universal banking should also be accompanied by a regulatory arrangement such as that of a
super-regulator for financial services.
There has been much debate about the necessary degree of
involvement of central banks in the supervision of Fis, but there is no doubt that when financial crises
loom, only central banks can provide the liquidity and the money to avert systemic risk. Thus, at least to
begin with, the RBI should be given a larger role in the supervision of universal banks, and the other

"

The United

Kingdom, Sweden,

Norway,

Denmark, Mexico

and

Hungary

have

adopted

the super-regulator

concept. The United Kingdom's Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, creates the Financial Service Authortv
which is now the single statutory regulator responsible for regulating deposit-taking, insurance and investment
business. In the United States, under the new Gramr-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernizanon Art, 2000, the
Federal Reserve has been given the equivalent powers of a backstop consolidated regulatory authority. In India,
the concept of a super-regulator was propounded by the working group for harmonizing the role and operations
of DFIs. The Committee on Banking Reforms, 1998, under the chairmanship of M Narasimbam, suggested the
restructuring of the existing Board for Financial Supervision within the RBL The Committee recommended that an
integrated system of regulanon and supervision be put in place to regulate and supervise the activities of banks,
financial instutions, and Non Banking Finance Companies It suggested that Section 58 of the Reserve Bank of India
Act should be amended to frame regulations to set up a separate and distinct Board for Financial Regulation and
Supervision- The Advisory Group on Securities Market Regulation, chaired by Deepak Parekh, recommended that
the existing arrangement of a High Level Group on Capital Markets, which has representatives of the RBI, SEBI, the
IRDA, and the Finance Ministry, should be accorded legal status and made the apex coordinator of the financial
system. This group called for exploring the feasibility of an umbrella regulatory legislation, which creates an apre
regulatory authority without disturbing the existing jurisdiction. CHAbAVARrI, sufemn
note 97, at 14-15, 33-34.
'' The reasons why a super-regulator may be relevant and is required in developing countries also is that the

occurrence of scams like the 1992 securities scam and the Madhavpura scam serve as reminders that it is necessan
for regulators to keep a wary eye on the links between these market participants. Financial Products are also
becoming hybrid in nature. Furthermore, the product complexity well exceeds the ability of inexperienced
investors to understand the risks of the products they are taking up. Indeed, products often seem designed
expressly to be complicated and confusing. Since these are competing products, there is a need for one agencv
that can supervise all of them and their modes of selling, thus ensuring that false claims sre not made, that there
are proper disclosures, and that consumer grievances are redressed. Technology is an important factor that must
be taken into account. With new technology, new trading platforms have developed that can deliver financis
services by bypassing the intermediary altogether. Further, technology can blur the distinct boundaries drawn
between industies and there will be a convergence of several industries and platforms. Hence, a super-regulator
comprising the interests of all the various affected industries is better suited to handle the problems of the
convergent industry A co-ordinated emergency response mechanism is required to resolve problems that

threaten financial stability or pose a contagion risk to the health of the conglomerate and other financial
institutions. A consolidated financial services regulator would be best positioned to monitor, prevent, and resolve
such aks. Consolidation of individual functional regulators, given a clear statutory mandate, would bring abou
significant economics of scale through the elimination of duplicate services existing among functional regulatonrs.
Management policy, financial accounting, information technology, and support staff could be amalgamated.
Information systems and network platforms could be standardized, centrally maintained, and better protected
from espionage. A single regulator can respond more effectively to market innovation and development as there
would be no regulatory gray areas. See CHAKRAVArry, sm note 97, at 24-28.

24

Development of UnuersalBanking
agencies should only supplement the RBI in its supervision. In the context of India, such a power may be
welcome considering that the SEBI has not been successful in preventing securities scams from occurring,
101
despite imposing many rules and regulations.
A study of the trends in American regulation of universal banking and the reasons motivating Indian
policy-makers to move towards universal banking shows that the reasons have been completely different in
these countries. The demand for universal banking in the United States came from the failing commercial
banks that felt that the restriction on them deaing with securities had dried up avenues of profitability for
thern, and that investment banks had an unfair advantage. On the other hand, in India, the push towards
universal banking has come from the FIs, which feel that with the development of new hedging
instruments such as derivatives, corporations can raise cheaper funds from these markets, as also the
commercial paper market and the corporate bonds market. While American universal banks can rely on
the sheer power of the securities markets in the United States to increase their profits, the same may not be
true of banks in India, where securities markets are not as powerful. Hence, universal banking can only be
viewed with cautious optimism. There is no doubt that universal banking offers an opportunity for Indian
banks to gain in size and compete effectively on a global level. But any paradigmatic change should prove
beyond a doubt that its benefits outweigh the costs. At present, the apprehensions are that the fallout of
changes contemplated would be adverse to certain sectors of economic activity, and that the likely economic
costs would be more than the gains of the positive impact on the benefiting banks and FIs. If policy
makers want to portray reforms with a human face, then universal banking has to be suited to meet the
peculiarities of the Indian social, economic, and political milieu, Thus, there have to be enough safeguards
and regulatory mechanisms, such as that of the super-regulator, in place, to ensure that financial services are
available to all at an affordable cost. Access to financial services should not become an elitist privilege.

mSection

12 (1) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, empowers SEBI to register any
intermediary who may be associated with the securities market. No stockbroker, sub-broker, share transfer agent,
banker to an issue, trustee of trust deed, registrar to an issue, merchant banker, underwriter, portfolio manager,
investment adviser, and such other intermediary who may he associated with the securities market can buy, sell or
deal in securities except under, and in accordance with the conditions of a certificate of registration obtained
from SETBJ, in accordance with the rules made under the Act. Significanty, however, the Unit Trust of India (UTI),
the country,. largest mutual fund, does not come under the supervision of SEH, but is directly under the control
of the Ministry of Finance. As a result, SEBI was largcly ineffective in ensuring that the UTIs US-64 scheme
disclosed its net asset value, which has been in large part responsible for the crisis in that fund. Therefore, the
presence of an effective single regulator may have been able to check or detect the UTI crisis much before it
worsened.
SSpra note 79.

25

